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Voters	dislike	disproportionality	in	electoral	systems
–	even	when	it	benefits	the	party	they	support
Taking	advantage	of	a	uniquely	designed	survey	experiment,	Carolina	Plescia,	André	Blais	and	John	Högström
investigate	the	effect	of	proportionality	on	voter	support	for	voting	rules	in	four	countries,	namely	Austria,	the	UK,
Ireland	and	Sweden.	They	find	that	voters	for	both	small	and	large	parties	dislike	disproportionality	in	electoral
systems,	with	little	cross-country	variation.
Protest	for	proportional	representation,	UK.	Picture:	Jason	/	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)	licence
In	2015,	the	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP)	received	12.6%	of	the	votes	at	the	general	election	but	won	only	a
single	seat.	This	sparked	a	discussion	in	the	media	about	the	fairness	of	the	election	rules	used	to	elect	the	House
of	Commons	and	led	to	the	resignation	of	the	then-UKIP	party	leader,	Nigel	Farage,	who	had	failed	to	win	a	seat.
Discussions	about	how	votes	are	translated	into	seats	are	common	in	the	aftermath	of	elections	in	many	countries.
But	are	those	who	‘complain’	about	the	unfairness	of	electoral	rules	simply	‘sore	losers’	blaming	the	system	for	their
loss?	More	generally,	the	question	is:	does	the	type	of	votes-to-seats	conversion	–	more	versus	less	proportional	–
matter?	Do	winners	and	losers	react	similarly	to	a	possible	‘unfair’	distribution	of	seats?	Are	people	willing	to
support	an	unfair	system	simply	because	their	party	is	advantaged?	These	are	important	research	questions
because	we	know	it	is	crucial	for	the	stability	of	democratic	systems	that	especially	those	who	supported	the	losing
side	in	an	election	are	willing	to	recognise	the	legitimacy	of	the	process	and	comply	with	election	outcomes.
To	examine	whether	the	proportionality	of	the	voting	rules	matter	for	both	groups	of	large	and	small	parties’	voters,
we	made	use	of	a	randomised	survey	experiment	for	a	recent	paper	published	in	European	Journal	of	Political
Research.	The	experimental	set	up	deals	with	a	problem	that	would	plague	any	observational	study.	Commonly
disproportionality	advantages	larger	parties	and	disadvantages	smaller	ones,	so	it	becomes	almost	impossible
using	non-experimental	data	to	assess	whether	voters’	reaction	to	the	electoral	outcome	is	due	to	the	performance
of	the	party	they	support	or	the	voting	rules.	By	using	random	assignment,	our	experiments	can	directly	manipulate
party	performance	(high	or	low)	and	the	proportionality	of	the	electoral	outcome	(high	or	low),	so	that	alternative
explanations	can	be	ruled	out.	In	addition,	the	same	study	was	conducted	in	four	countries,	which	differ
substantially	in	terms	of	electoral	rules.	Three	of	these	countries	use	a	proportional	system	–	Austria,	Ireland	and
Sweden	–	while	the	UK	uses	a	majoritarian	rule.	These	features	afford	us	an	opportunity	to	test	whether	our	results
hold	across	systems	and	to	check	whether	there	is	a	status	quo	bias	leading	people	to	prefer	election	procedures
that	do	not	deviate	from	what	they	are	used	to.
In	the	survey,	respondents	were	asked:	‘On	a	scale	of	0–10,	where	0	means	“not	at	all	satisfied”	and	10	means
“very	satisfied”,	how	satisfied	are	you	with	these	voting	rules	that	you	have	just	used	for	elections	in	[COUNTRY	of
STUDY]?’.	Figure	1	shows	the	estimated	average	response	conditional	on	whether	the	respondents’	party
performance	is	low	or	high	and	whether	the	conversion	of	votes	into	seats	is	proportional	or	disproportional.		
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When	it	comes	to	party	performance,	between-group	differences	are	significant,	though	not	very	large:	high	party
performance	increases	support	for	the	voting	rules	among	that	party’s	supporters,	and	this	is	true	in	both	the
proportional	and	disproportional	scenarios.	Figure	1,	however,	also	shows	significant	within-group	differences.
Namely,	disproportionality	decreases	support	for	the	voting	rule	so	that	both	groups	of	voters	are	significantly	less
satisfied	under	disproportional	outcomes.	The	results	are	illuminating	especially	for	voters	who	support	large
parties:	even	if	the	conversion	of	votes	into	seats	advantages	large	parties	in	the	disproportional	scenario,
disproportionality	still	exerts	a	negative	effect	on	support	among	this	group	of	voters.	Not	only	within-groups
differences	but	also	within-subject	differences	are	significant.	Table	1	shows	that	while	there	is	no	significant
difference	in	support	for	the	voting	rule	if	a	respondent	is	in	the	same	condition	in	both	elections	(either	proportional
or	disproportional),	support	declines	if	a	respondent	moves	from	proportional	to	disproportional	voting	rules	(and
vice	versa).
Figure	1:	Election	outcome	and	voter	support	for	the	voting	rules
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	European	Journal	of	Political	Research.
Table	1:	Within-subject	differences	in	support	for	the	voting	rules
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Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	European	Journal	of	Political	Research.
In	terms	of	satisfaction	with	the	conversion	of	votes	into	seats,	even	if	large	parties	are	‘unfairly’	advantaged	by	the
disproportional	system	in	terms	of	seats,	supporters	of	these	parties	still	prefer	the	fairer	(more	proportional)
conversion.	We	also	find	that	the	difference	between	being	a	small	party	supporter	in	a	disproportional	versus
proportional	system	is	negative	and	significant	–	that	is,	small	parties’	supporters	do	not	appreciate	the
disproportional	conversion	of	votes	into	seats.	The	use	of	additional	dependent	variables	that	focus	specifically	on
satisfaction	with	the	election	result	and	the	conversion	of	votes	into	seats	shows	that	disproportionality	negatively
affects	satisfaction	with	the	voting	rule	among	small	parties’	voters	because	it	is	unfair.	Overall	this	suggests	that
disproportional	rules	make	voters	less	satisfied:	large	parties’	voters,	especially,	are	not	simply	‘delighted	voters’
that	disregard	how	votes	have	been	converted	into	seats.	They	want	a	fair	system	and	they	do	not	like	a
disproportional	system,	even	when	disproportionality	advantages	their	party.
Though	conclusions	about	system-specific	findings	should	be	treated	with	caution,	given	that	there	are	only	four
countries	in	our	study,	we	also	tested	whether	concern	about	proportionality	is	lower	in	countries	where	national
elections	are	more	disproportional.	Namely,	we	would	expect	that	respondents	in	Austria	and	Sweden	should	react
more	negatively	to	disproportionality	than	respondents	in	Ireland	and	especially	in	the	UK,	who	are	used	to
disproportional	results.	Austrians	and	Swedes	should	react	more	negatively	to	the	unfair	outcomes	because	they
deviate	from	the	‘fair’	votes-to-seats	distribution	they	are	used	to.	However,	the	results	indicate	that	proportionality
is	‘noted’	even	more	in	a	country	not	used	to	proportional	rules,	a	result	that	does	not	square	well	with	a	status	quo
bias	argument.	In	sum,	we	find	little	status	quo	bias,	at	least	in	the	four	countries	included	in	our	study.
Electoral	systems	should	be	judged	using	many	more	criteria	than	simply	looking	at	how	proportional	the	electoral
outcome	is;	however,	there	is	one	aspect	of	electoral	systems	that	is	very	visible	to	the	public	and	as	such	often
debated	in	times	of	proposed	electoral	reforms,	namely	the	proportionality	in	the	conversion	of	votes	into	seats.	Our
findings	provide	strong	support	for	the	idea	that	citizens	do	care	about	how	votes	are	converted	into	seats,	with
disproportionality	decreasing	support	for	the	voting	rule	among	both	large	and	small	parties’	voters.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	Democratic	Audit.	For	more	on	this	research,	see
the	authors’	recent	article,	“Do	people	want	a	‘fairer’	electoral	system?	An	experimental	study	in	four	countries”,
published	in	the	European	Journal	of	Political	Research.
About	the	authors
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